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FALKLANDS ORDNANCE EXPLOITATION – JANUARY 2017 
This report and the associated exploitation work were funded by the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In January 2017, exploitation work was carried out by Fenix Insight Ltd on mines and other ordnance 
recovered by the Land Release Contractor (LRC). 
Examination of grenades used in booby traps revealed that one, considered to be complex and dangerous, 
had been rendered safe by the ageing process.  The other, though more familiar, was still fully functional 
and highly lethal.  The findings highlight the continued danger from unexploded ordnance, and the need for 
threat assessment to be based on technical evidence rather than intuition. 
The LRC had found that a certain batch of P4B anti-personnel mines were more readily detectable than the 
types encountered previously. Exploitation established that an additional aluminium capsule was present 
within mines produced after 1980.  This means that they can be located to depths of 20 cm or more, 
substantially increasing the rate of clearance.   Inert examples were produced for the LRC and DPO. 
Continued testing of fuzes contributed to the body of evidence gathered on previous phases of 
exploitation. Of the 100 fuzes tested during this phase, only one was capable of detonating the 
main charge.  This suggests that the majority of P4B mines are now non-functional, and that the 
entire population of these mines is nearing the end of its life.  In the unlikely event that 
somebody both encountered and actuated a P4B, the likelihood of detonation and resultant injury would 
be extremely low.  
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FALKLANDS ORDNANCE EXPLOITATION – JANUARY 2017 
 
 
Introduction 
Exploitation1 work for Phase 5a was conducted by Colin King (hereafter ‘CK’), technical director of Fenix 
Insight Ltd, from 6-12 January 2017.  The ordnance set aside for exploitation by the Land Release 
Contractor (LRC) included the following items.   
 
Type Designation Country of origin 
Grenade M5 Spain 
Grenade M67 USA 
Explosive blocks Charge, demolition, TNT, 1lb USA 
Anti-personnel (AP) mine P4B  Spain  
Anti-tank (AT) mine C3B Spain 
 
Fenix was also asked to examine images taken of Argentine ‘M1’ anti-tank mines encountered during the 
previous clearance phase. 
 
Aim 
The aim of this report is to outline the findings from the exploitation work, with particular emphasis on: 
 The general condition of the ordnance 
 The functionality of fuzing mechanisms 
 The viability of energetic materials 
 Significant changes to characteristics that might affect detectability or sensitivity. 
 
Recovery of Ordnance 
Following assessments from previous exploitation work, the P4B AP and C3B AT mines were recovered by 
the LRC during clearance operations.  The mines were defuzed and stored, with bodies and fuzes in 
separate ISO containers, in the holding area.   
A booby trap incorporating an M5 grenade, identified and marked in SA108 by the LRC, was neutralised and 
lifted by CK.  A further booby trap incorporating an M67 grenade was neutralised and recovered from 
SA020 by the LRC. 
 
Methodology 
Prior to deployment, risk assessments were carried out for each type of ordnance, together with a 
provisional plan for disassembly and testing.  A specialist tool kit was brought from the UK, with more 
common hand tools being bought in the Falklands.  Local contacts assisted with the provision of other 
equipment such as a workbench, vice, generator and lighting.   
 
As always, the support and cooperation of the LRC was critical to the success of the mission, and included 
the provision of equipment, access to Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHAs) and the provision of a medic.  
 
The work flow followed the standard Fenix process map for exploitation activity, with reviews conducted 
as-and-when necessary.   
 
                                                          
1
  In this context, ‘exploitation’ is the characterisation of an item of ordnance; this usually involves disassembly, 
examination and testing of components. 
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Ordnance disassembly was carried out in an ISO container in Pony Pass quarry, adjacent to the explosive 
storage and burning site used by the Land Release Contractor (LRC).  Access to the area surrounding the 
makeshift Ammunition Processing Building (APB) was controlled during the exploitation process. 
 
The APB was established in an ISO container, in a 
disused section of the quarry at Pony Pass 
A simple work station was set up, with specialist tools 
brought from the UK and others purchased locally 
 
Explosive testing 
The explosive testing of P4B detonators was an important part of the exploitation work, building on the 
body of data collected during Phase 4a.  No matter what the condition of the body, the fuze mechanism or 
the main charge, a mine is incapable of functioning as designed unless the detonator is serviceable.  The 
testing of detonators is therefore critical to the real-world evaluation of the risk currently posed by these 
mines, and for the prediction of long-term residual risk.   
 
A rig was improvised, in which a heavy steel rod could be lowered onto a mine fuze in order to actuate it.  
The mechanism was operated from a distance by a pulling line, meaning that the operators required only 
eye protection.  A simple release latch held the rod in the raised position while the fuze was placed on the 
anvil, with the latch releasing automatically when the line was pulled.  One hundred fuzes were tested 
using this method, with video recording used throughout. 
 
The explosive test rig used a rope and pulley to 
lower a steel rod onto the mine fuze 
A P4B mine fuze placed on the test rig, ready 
for the rod to be dropped 
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EXAMINATION OF ORDNANCE 
 
M5 grenade booby trap 
The booby trap consisted of a Spanish M5 grenade, which was wired to two wooden stakes at ground level.  
Adjacent to the grenade were two 1-pound blocks of TNT.  Unlike other booby traps found to date, the 
anchorage of the device used purpose-made stakes made from treated wood and copper wire, both of 
which remained in good condition. 
The M5 booby trap, prior to recovery The stakes and wire were still in good condition 
The use of treated wood and copper wire means that the grenade is held firmly, which is key to successful 
operation should the tripwire be pulled.  Without this, the grenade might be pulled out of the ground 
without functioning.  In this case, the tripwire was absent, having been made from steel and rusted away. 
 
The M5 is a Spanish hand grenade made by Expal (who also manufactured the P4B and C3B mines).  It is 
unusually complex, incorporating fuzing mechanisms for both impact and delay initiation; this makes it 
potentially hazardous to handle.  The grenade has a plastic body that can be fitted with a steel 
fragmentation cup; in this example, the cup had not been fitted. 
 
The body of the grenade appeared to be in good condition, with no discolouration, cracking or other 
external signs of deterioration.  The fly-off lever – the primary arming device – had rusted away, revealing 
the two arming plungers of the fuze mechanism.  These are spring-loaded and designed to move as soon as 
the lever is released; their exposure raised the concern that the grenade could be initiated by the slightest 
movement.   
 
Before the trap was moved, a block was secured into place to prevent the plungers from moving.  The 
grenade, and other components of the booby trap were then recovered to the APB for exploitation.  Details 
of the findings are at Annex A. 
 
M67 Booby Trap 
Another booby trap recently encountered by the LRC incorporated an American M67 grenade as the 
initiator.  This grenade appeared to be in good condition and, being familiar to the LRC, was recovered by 
them prior to the Fenix visit, and stored ready for exploitation.  Details of the M67 grenade examination are 
at Annex B. 
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TNT demolition blocks 
The TNT blocks used in the M5 grenade booby trap were also recovered for examination.  Blocks of this 
type were routinely used by Argentine sappers in the construction of booby traps, and many more are likely 
to be encountered as clearance work progresses. 
 
The blocks appeared to be in very poor condition, but this was largely due to the degradation of the 
cardboard sleeves and the heavily rusted end caps.  Internally, the TNT was in good condition, and fully 
capable of detonation.   The same conclusion was reached during the examination of similar TNT blocks 
during a previous phase of exploitation. 
 
Findings from First World War battlefields confirm that high grade TNT can remain intact for more than 100 
years.  However, TNT requires substantial shock, or other energy input, in order achieve detonation – 
especially when it is not encased.  The danger posed by these blocks is therefore wholly dependent on the 
viability of the primary munition in a booby trap. 
 
The TNT blocks appeared to be heavily degraded Internally, the explosive was still in good condition 
 
P4B anti-personnel mines 
 
Detectability 
Until recently, all of the recovered P4B mine bodies and fuze assemblies were produced in batch number 2-
5-78 (1978 being the year of production).  A number of mines from this batch have been examined and 
tested during previous phases of exploitation.  The detectability of these mines has been very poor, 
generally allowing location to a depth of no more than 5 cm, and frequently less.  In previous clearance 
phases, this meant that detection was not an option, and that all mines had to be located manually by 
excavation. 
 
In contrast, a high proportion of the P4B mines cleared during Phase 5a were found to be detectable at far 
greater depths (around 20 cm).  All of these mines appeared to come from a different lot, namely 1-11-80.  
A large number of these mines were recovered and retained for examination during exploitation. 
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P4B mines from Lot 1-11-80 were found to be far more detectable than the types previously encountered.  
The variation in markings was also unusual for mines originating from the same batch. 
 
Functionality 
Impact testing was carried out using the explosive test rig, to establish the proportion of fuzes that 
remained capable of functioning.  This method subjects the fuze (separated from the main charge) to an 
impact well above the threshold required for initiation.  Only complete fuzes in reasonably good condition 
are used, so that the energetic material is being tested, rather than the mechanism.  This testing 
augmented work from previous phases in order to build a significant evidence base. 
 
Detailed findings from the exploitation of P4B mines are given in Annex C. 
 
C3B anti-tank mines 
Three C3B mine bodies and 5 fuzes were made available for exploitation.   One of the casings was badly 
cracked, but otherwise all components appeared to be in good external condition.  The fuze of the C3B is 
the same as that of the P4B, except that the mechanism is protected by an outer plastic housing, which 
raises the operating pressure to a level more appropriate to an AT mine (approximately 275 kg). 
 
The outer fuze housing provides an additional barrier against the ingress of water, which is normally the 
primary cause of degradation within the fuze.  This means that, all other factors being equal, C3B fuzes are 
likely to remain functional for longer than P4B fuzes. 
The protective housing of the C3B raises the operating pressure, 
but also helps to keep water out 
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If the fuze housing cracks, then the operating pressure could be substantially lowered, perhaps to a level 
where the mine could be actuated by a person.  However, the ingress of water is also likely to accelerate 
the degradation of the fuze to the point where it is no longer functional. 
 
The main charge of the C3B tends to remain in very good condition, regardless of cracks in the casing or the 
ingress of water.  Once again, great variation in explosive composition was encountered, with some parts of 
the filling heavily aluminised and others where virtually no aluminium was evident.  At present, the metal 
dust plays no part in the mine’s detectability and only affects its explosive power.  If, at some point, the 
metal were involved in a new detection technique, then the variation in content might be significant. 
 
The central booster and main charge in C3B mines 
tend to remain in good condition 
The distribution of aluminium within the explosive is 
very uneven; in some case, virtually absent 
 
Argentinian ‘M1’ mine 
The steel-cased Argentinian AT mine used in the Falklands has been nick-named the ‘M1’, due to its 
similarity to the US anti-tank mine of that designation; its correct nomenclature is not known.   
 
One example of the ‘M1’ was seen during exploitation in March 2015.  The mine had been recovered by the 
LRC as an unidentified type, with no fuze and a filling thought to be inert (possibly concrete).  The schedule 
did not permit full exploitation, but a brief examination confirmed that this was an Argentinian ‘M1’ and 
that the filling was TNT.   
 
A field of ‘M1’ mines was encountered during Phase 4 clearance, but no exploitation was conducted that 
year.  Photos of some mines were taken, permitting some basic analysis; this is given at Annex D. 
 
 
 
 
This mine was recovered 
during Phase 4.  A brief 
examination concluded that 
it was an ‘M1’ and that, 
what at first appeared to be 
an inert filling, was in fact 
TNT.  No fuze was present 
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Creation of inert samples 
A number of P4B and C3B mines were rendered inert, including the extraction of initiation compositions 
and primary explosive from the detonators.   This allowed the construction of inert versions of the 
detectable P4B mines for the use of the LRC and DPO. 
 
Some samples of mines, fuzes and components will be returned to the UK, to be held by Fenix for further 
research, training and future reference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of inert training aids 
were produced, including 
sectioned P4B mines and inert 
mines, reconstructed with 
detectable detonator capsules 
 
KEY CONCLUSIONS ON AGEING AND FUNCTIONALITY 
Mines 
 
After a certain length of time, all ordnance will eventually lose the ability to function as designed.  It may 
still incorporate hazardous material for some considerable period, but this is unlikely to constitute a threat 
during the course of day-to-day activity. 
 
The period over which an item of ordnance fails will vary, depending mainly on the vulnerability of the 
materials and the environment in which they exist.   The failure of a large proportion of P4B mines during 
testing indicates that most are no longer capable of functioning as designed.   
 
Even among the most robust mine types (the Italian SB-33 anti-personnel and SB-81 anti-tank), testing 
during an earlier phase of exploitation revealed that a substantial proportion were now non-functional. 
 
The time scale on the failure distribution curve (see Annex C) is difficult to predict and will differ for each 
type of ordnance.  However, there is evidence that the degradation process accelerates once water enters 
the casing.  Thirty five years after the conflict, the vast majority of P4B mines are already non-functional, it 
is therefore reasonable to predict that very few, if any, will survive the next 10 years. 
 
Evidence collected during exploitation so far, in conjunction with extensive studies of landmine ageing in 
other countries, suggests that the entire population of mines in the Falklands is nearing the end of its 
operational life.  In the unlikely event that somebody both encounters and actuates a mine at some point in 
the future, the risk of detonation and resultant injury is low.  That risk will continue to diminish, year on 
year. 
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Unexploded ordnance (UXO)  
 
Findings from the exploitation of the M5 and M67 grenades illustrate the fallibility of intuitive risk 
assessment.  The M5, considered to be highly dangerous and unpredictable, turned out to be non-
functional, with multiple points of failure. The M67, being more familiar and therefore considered ‘safer’, 
proved to remain highly lethal. 
 
After many years with few serious incidents, the local population are also in danger of becoming somewhat 
blasé about the risks from UXO. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Exploitation should be conducted on samples of additional types of mine, and other ordnance, as they are 
encountered.  Significant types of ordnance not yet examined include: 
 
Designation Type Origin Notes 
BL-755 Dual-purpose submunition UK Subject to Convention on Cluster Munitions 
FMK-1 Anti-personnel mine Argentina Plastic-cased, minimum-metal 
FMK-3 Anti-tank mine Argentina Plastic-cased, non-metallic 
M1 Anti-tank mine Argentina Steel-cased, vulnerable to degradation 
No 4 Anti-personnel mine Israel Plastic-cased, resilient 
No 6 Anti-tank mine Israel Steel-cased, resilient 
 
Additional functionality testing should be conducted on mines recovered by the LRC during future phases of 
exploitation.  The resultant data should be charted and analysed in order to establish trends and predict 
failure time scales.  This may help to quantify the risk from any ordnance that evades the clearance process. 
 
The residual risks posed by types of UXO other than landmines should be analysed and monitored.  
Technical findings should be made known to the LRC and EOD community as a whole.   
 
Awareness messages and education on residual risks from UXO should be disseminated to the population 
of the Falklands. 
 
 
Colin King 
Technical Director 
Fenix Insight Ltd 
 
January 2017 
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ANNEX A 
EXPLOITATION OF THE M5 GRENADE 
Background 
The M5 is an unusually complex grenade manufactured by the same Spanish company  (Explosivos Alavese 
‘EXPAL’ SA) that produced the P4B and C3B mines.  Once the safety pin has been withdrawn, release of the 
fly-off lever initiates a firing delay, but can also be set to arm an impact fuze. The impact fuze uses an ‘all-
ways acting’ mechanism, so called because it functions no matter what the direction of impact.  This makes 
it inherently dangerous, and therefore of concern during disposal. 
 
The Spanish M5 grenade.  The lower casing of the live grenade is black 
 
Findings 
Exploitation revealed that the main charge was in good condition and appeared to consist of Composition B 
(RDX/TNT mixture) rather than the pure TNT mentioned in technical references.  Composition B is  
substantially more powerful than TNT, causing greater blast and, therefore, being far more likely to initiate 
the adjacent TNT charges. 
 
The main charge was moulded around every 
component, making disassembly difficult 
Examination quickly revealed the level of 
deterioration within the fuze mechanisms 
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The fuzing mechanisms, however, were heavily corroded and it soon became apparent that neither of the 
actuating sequences could function.  The primary and secondary arming plungers were seized into place, 
with their actuating springs rusted away and no longer capable of applying any force; this means that the 
mechanism was incapable of arming as designed. 
 
The delay fuze relies on an arming plunger releasing a spring-loaded slide onto a firing pin; this initiates a 
pyrotechnic delay while also bringing a secondary detonator into line.  The space into which the slide 
moves was filled with aluminium oxide, the slide itself was seized into place and the spring had rusted 
away.  The delay composition was no longer viable and it is likely that the detonator was also non-
functional.  The same was found with the impact fuze, with all mechanical components corroded and 
seized, and energetic elements apparently deteriorated. 
 
All of the major fuzing components were badly corroded and non-functional 
 
Conclusions 
The conclusion of these findings was that the M5 grenade was completely incapable of functioning as 
designed.  Ageing of the complex fuzing mechanism has resulted in multiple points of failure, effectively 
rendering the grenade safe.  The high explosive charge remained viable; however, there was no internal 
means by which it could be initiated. 
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ANNEX B 
EXAMINATION OF M67 GRENADE 
 
Background 
The M67 is one of a series of grenades, based around similar bodies, but with different fuzing variations.  
Most hand grenades are straightforward in design, but some variants of the M67 used a more complex fuze 
incorporating an electronic delay function.  The markings on the grenade were faint, so the first priority 
was to identify the version beyond doubt. 
 
The grenade was in remarkably good condition, 
considering its age 
The fuze type and markings confirm that the 
grenade is indeed a US M67 
Examination 
Once cleaned, it was clear that the grenade was in surprisingly good condition, with only minimal and 
superficial rust in places.  Markings were just about discernible and confirmed the identification as an M67.  
The fuze was confirmed as an M213 pyrotechnic delay of the type normally associated with the M67. 
 
Removal of the initiation set (the assembly comprising the fuze, detonator, fly-off lever and safety pin) 
required a substantial amount of force, but the tight fit and presence of a sealing O-ring had prevented 
water from entering the grenade body.  This meant that the detonator and main charge were in excellent 
condition. 
 
In order to establish the functionality of the fuze, it was mounted onto the explosive test rig so that the 
safety pin could be pulled out, using a line, from a safe distance. 
 
Preparing to test the M67 fuze The result of the detonation 
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Once the pin had been pulled, there was a delay of approximately 4 seconds before the detonator 
exploded.  This confirmed that the both the fuzing mechanism and the energetic components of the 
detonator assembly had been fully functional.   
 
Had the body been fitted, there is no doubt that the grenade would have functioned as intended.  Unlike 
the anti-personnel mines encountered during clearance work in the Falklands, this grenade has a ‘coined’ 
(pre-fragmented) steel casing with the potential to cause multiple fatalities. 
 
Making safe 
The M213 fuze has the provision for an additional safety clip, which is fitted as standard during 
manufacture.  It is normal EOD practice to use duct tape to bind the fly-off lever into position on grenades; 
however, this is best used as a temporary measure.  Duct tape can stretch or creep apart – especially if it is 
damp and under tension (as it may be if the safety pin fails for any reason). 
 
The secondary pin hole allows a steel pin or wire to be inserted through the fuze body, directly blocking the 
path of the striker.  The notch on the fuze body also allows the fly-off lever to be wired into place.  The 
images below show the locations of these safety features, and how they can be used. 
 
Safety features of the M213 fuze body Safety wiring with the fly-off lever in place 
 
Conclusions 
 
The remarkably good condition of the M67 grenade was probably due to a combination of materials and 
build quality; this means that others may also be well-preserved and fully functional.  
 
Of the various components liable to failure, the safety pin is among the most vulnerable.  Failure of the 
safety pin could make movement of the grenade extremely dangerous. 
 
Recommendations 
 
The M67 should be considered, and treated as, a high threat item.  Its continued functionality and potential 
to cause multiple fatalities should be clearly understood. 
 
The render-safe procedure for the M67 should include placement of a steel pin through the secondary pin 
hole to positively block the impact of the striker. 
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ANNEX C 
EXPLOITATION OF P4B MINES 
Background 
During the early stages of Phase 5a, a substantial number of P4B mines were located by the LRC and 
recovered to their storage facility, awaiting destruction.  All of these mines were made available for 
exploitation, the aim of which was to focus on their detectability and functionality. 
 
Detectability 
When new, the striker spring of the P4B weighs just 0.14 g is detectable to a maximum of 5 cm.  Sometimes 
the spring cannot be detected at all, and previous exploitation work revealed that many springs have rusted 
away altogether.  The metallic foil covering the main charge also makes little contribution to the detection 
signature.  Until now, this minimal detection signature has meant using manual excavation to locate mines. 
 
Early in Phase 5a, it emerged that many of the P4B mines being encountered were detectable to around 20 
cm; all of these more detectable mines came from the same production batch: Lot 1-11-80.  
The spring in the P4B fuze is only detectable to a 
maximum of 5 cm, and many have rusted away 
The red metallic foil is a lead/tin/antimony alloy 
and is virtually undetectable 
 
In the P4B mines recovered and examined in previous phases, the detonators were pressed directly into the 
plastic well of the detonator plug.  Examination of the fuzes from mines of lot 1-11-80 indicated that the 
detonators were contained in small aluminium capsules.   
 
The detonator compositions of mines from 1978 (left) are pressed directly into the plastic of the 
detonator plug, while those of the 1980 mines (right) are contained in an aluminium capsule 
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A number of detonator capsules were extracted from mines belonging to lot 1-11-80, and all of the 
energetic material removed.  Each capsule is approximately 7mm in diameter and 6 mm high, made from 
aluminium alloy and weighing approximately 0.1 g.  The capsules were then tested, with the Minelab metal 
detector used by the LRC, to establish the distance at which they could be detected.   
 
The detonator capsule from a lot 1-11-80 P4B Testing the detectability of the capsule 
 
Despite the relatively crude test, it was possible to establish that each of these detonator capsules could be 
detected to around 20 cm (in air, with no other detectable material nearby).   
 
When the additional metallic components of the mine (the remains of the spring and foil) were placed in 
their normal positions in relation to the capsule, the detection distance often increased.  These increases 
ranged from 0 (no discernible difference) to 5 cm beyond the distance measured using the capsule alone. 
 
Detonator functionality 
Detonator function tests were performed, using the improvised test rig, on a number of fuzes recovered 
from different locations; these included fuzes both with and without aluminium detonator capsules.  Only 
complete fuzes, in good external condition, were selected for the test. 
 
The results were as follows: 
 Of the 100 fuzes tested, only 3 produced any reaction at all.   
 Of these, two produced a weak effect, indicating that only the composition in the stab receptor had 
been consumed; this had failed to initiate the primary and secondary explosive in the detonator.   
 Only one fuze functioned fully, and would have detonated the main charge in the mine body. 
 
In two fuzes, only the stab receptor functioned, 
with the detonator failing to explode 
Of the 100 fuzes tested, only one detonated, 
and would have initiated the main charge 
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Conclusions 
 
Detection.  The detonator capsules in P4B mines from lot 1-11-80 allow them to be reliably detected to a 
depth of 20 cm or more.   This has already allowed the LRC to locate mines substantially faster than they 
could when using excavation alone. 
 
Functionality.  The findings from the functionality testing build on the evidence of previous phases, 
confirming that the majority of P4B mines are no longer capable of functioning as designed.  The sample 
sizes are too small to have real statistical significance and other factors, such as location and immediate 
environment, may be influential.  However, exploitation and testing appears to indicate that the proportion 
of mines remaining functional is decreasing noticeably, year on year. 
 
This would support the expectation that the rate of failure among mines is following a normal distribution 
curve, and that the current position is well towards the end of that curve, as shown in the illustration 
below. 
 
The decline in mine functionality is expected to follow a normal distribution curve.  Testing indicates that 
most P4B and C3B mines have already reach the end of their functional life  
FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY 
 
Residual risk.  It is not possible to put precise timelines on the degradation process, nor to predict the 
overall proportion of mines affected, although additional data may allow more accurate assessments.  But 
it is clear that the residual risk is declining, and that – even now - an accidental encounter with a P4B is 
unlikely to result in detonation.  In future decades, this risk is likely to approach zero. 
 
Although they are very unlikely to be initiated by normal activities, non-functional mines should not be 
considered ‘safe’.  The fuzes and bodies still contain high explosive with the potential to cause destruction 
and injury.  Detonations during the burning process used for disposal by the LRC prove that the majority of 
the explosive components are still capable of functioning, if they are subjected to sufficient energy. 
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ANNEX D 
ANALYSIS OF ‘M1’ MINE IMAGES 
 
Background 
The following photos were taken of ‘M1’ mines encountered by the LRC during Phase 4.  No exploitation 
was carried out and CK did not see these mines in the field; however, some basic deductions can be made 
from the images. 
 
Analysis 
 
 
Observation 
Most images show mines in flat, stable locations, 
within the bounds of expected burial depths, and 
with the main assemblies present.   
 
Deduction 
This suggests that they have remained largely 
undisturbed, and that the only significant influences 
will have been environmental. 
 
 
 
Observation 
Some mines are heavily degraded, to the point 
where even thick steel sections have rusted through. 
 
Deduction 
This generally appears to be the case with mines on, 
or near, the surface.  In the unlikely eventuality that 
the fuze were functional, these heavily degraded 
mines may have lost the structural integrity needed 
in order to function. 
  
 
Observation 
Although many mines are heavily rusted, a number 
appear to be in good condition, with external painted 
surfaces showing only superficial corrosion. 
 
Deduction 
The extreme differences in condition are surprising, 
since the mines are likely to have very similar 
characteristics, and all mines have been subjected to 
similar conditions for the same duration. It appears 
that burial can slow the degradation process.   
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Observation 
The casing of this mine is empty; there is a 
pronounced upward bend in one of the bars of the 
‘spider’, while the other bar has been displaced. 
 
Deduction 
The main explosive charge has almost certainly 
burned away, blowing out the large round filling 
plugs in the top surface.  Any remaining paint would 
have been burned off during the fire, rendering the 
casing more vulnerable to corrosion.  Since this mine 
is on the surface, yet only lightly rusted, it appears 
that the fire was fairly recent.  The damage to the 
spider bars was probably caused by explosion of the 
detonator.  This indicates that the primary explosive 
was still viable at the time of the fire.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Energetic components.  The booster and main charge of the ‘M1’, believed to be TNT, are likely to remain 
serviceable indefinitely.  The evidence of detonation seen in one burned-out mine indicates that the 
primary explosive of the detonator may also be functional.  Whether or not the initiating composition 
within the detonator remains viable will be dependent on how well sealed this assembly is. 
 
Mechanical components.  The type of fuze mechanism used in the ‘M1’ is not yet known, but the 
expectation is that any metallic components would have degraded to the point where the mechanism could 
no longer operate.  The presence of casings in good condition introduces some uncertainty regarding the 
condition of fuzes.    
 
Recommendations 
 
Examples of ‘M1’ mines in good condition should be recovered for exploitation, the purposes of which 
should be to: 
 
 Characterise the mine (external appearance, dimensions, weight, markings etc)  
 Photograph external appearance and internal components 
 Confirm the composition and viability of the main charge and booster 
 Determine the type of operating mechanism used in the fuze 
 Examine fuze components to assess functionality 
 Test the functionality of detonators 
 Establish whether there is a link between condition (or rate of degradation) and burial depth 
 Assess likelihood of any ‘M1’ mines remaining functional 
 Consider implications for clearance methods. 
 
